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Summary 
Executive orders, presidential memoranda, and proclamations are used extensively by Presidents 
to achieve policy goals, set uniform standards for managing the executive branch, or outline a 
policy view intended to influence the behavior of private citizens. The U.S. Constitution does not 
define these presidential instruments and does not explicitly vest the President with the authority 
to issue them. Nonetheless, such orders are accepted as an inherent aspect of presidential power. 
Moreover, if they are based on appropriate authority, they have the force and effect of law. This 
report discusses the nature of these written instruments, executive orders in particular, with a 
focus on the scope of presidential authority to execute such instruments, as well as judicial and 
congressional responses to their issuance. 
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Introduction 
Executive orders are one vehicle of many through which the President may exercise his authority. 
While the President’s ability to use executive orders as a means of implementing presidential 
power has been established as a matter of law and practice, it is equally well established that the 
substance of an executive order, including any requirements or prohibitions, may have the force 
and effect of law only if the presidential action is based on power vested in the President by the 
U.S. Constitution or delegated to the President by Congress. The President’s authority to issue 
executive orders does not include a grant of power to implement policy decisions that are not 
otherwise authorized by law. Indeed, an executive order that implements a policy in direct 
contradiction to the law will be without legal effect unless the order can be justified as an exercise 
of the President’s exclusive and independent constitutional authority.1 
This report first reviews the “definition” of an executive order and how it is distinguishable from 
other written instruments, and then provides an overview of the President’s constitutional 
authority to issue such directives. Next, the report discusses the legal framework relied on by the 
courts to analyze the validity of presidential actions, and also discusses the roles of the President 
and Congress in modifying and revoking executive orders. 
Definition and Authority 
Presidents have historically utilized various written instruments to direct the executive branch and 
implement policy.2 These include executive orders, presidential memoranda, and presidential 
proclamations. The definitions of these instruments, including the differences between them, are 
not easily discernible, as the U.S. Constitution does not contain any provision referring to these 
terms or the manner in which the President may communicate directives to the executive branch. 
A widely accepted description of executive orders and proclamations comes from a report issued 
in 1957 by the House Government Operations Committee: 
Executive orders and proclamations are directives or actions by the President. When they are 
founded on the authority of the President derived from the Constitution or statute, they may 
have the force and effect of law.... In the narrower sense Executive orders and proclamations 
are written documents denominated as such.... Executive orders are generally directed to, and 
govern actions by, Government officials and agencies. They usually affect private 
individuals only indirectly. Proclamations in most instances affect primarily the activities of 
private individuals. Since the President has no power or authority over individual citizens 
and their rights except where he is granted such power and authority by a provision in the 
Constitution or by statute, the President’s proclamations are not legally binding and are at 
best hortatory unless based on such grants of authority.3 
                                                 
1 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring) (stating that where a 
President “takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress” that “[c]ourts can sustain 
exclusive presidential control in such case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential 
claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution ...”).  
2 Other written instruments have historically included administrative orders, homeland security presidential directives, 
letters on tariffs and international trade, for example. For more background, see CRS Report 98-611, Presidential 
Directives: Background and Overview, by Elaine Halchin. 
3 Staff of House Comm. on Government Operations, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Executive Orders and Proclamations: A 
(continued...) 
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The distinction between these instruments—executive orders, presidential memoranda, and 
proclamations—seems to be more a matter of form than of substance,4 given that all three may be 
employed to direct and govern the actions of government officials and agencies.5 Moreover, if 
issued under a legitimate claim of authority and made public, a presidential directive could have 
the force and effect of law, “of which all courts are bound to take notice, and to which all courts 
are bound to give effect.”6 The only technical difference is that executive orders must be 
published in the Federal Register, while presidential memoranda and proclamations are published 
only when the President determines that they have “general applicability and legal effect.”7 
Just as there is no definition of executive orders, presidential memoranda, and proclamations in 
the U.S. Constitution, there is, likewise, no specific provision authorizing their issuance. As such, 
authority for the execution and implementation of these written instruments stems from implied 
constitutional and statutory authority. In the constitutional context, presidential power is derived 
from Article II of the U.S. Constitution, which states that “the executive power shall be vested in 
a President of the United States,” that “the President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States,” and that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”8 The President’s power to issue these directives may also derive from express or 
implied statutory authority.9 
Despite the amorphous nature of the authority to issue executive orders, presidential memoranda, 
and proclamations, these instruments have been employed by every President since the inception 
of the Republic.10 Notably, executive orders historically have been more contentious as Presidents 
have issued them over a wide range of controversial areas such as the establishment of internment 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
Study of a Use of Presidential Powers (Comm. Print 1957) [hereinafter Orders and Proclamations]. 
4 Id.  
5 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13658, 79 Fed. Reg. 9851 (February 12, 2014) (Establishing a Minimum Wage for 
Contractors); Exec. Order No. 13588, 76 Fed. Reg. 68295 (November 3, 2011) (Reducing Prescription Drug 
Shortages); Memorandum for Heads of Executive Dep’t and Agencies on Advancing Pay Equality in the Federal 
Government and Learning From Successful Practices (May 10, 2013); Memorandum to Secretary of State on Waiver of 
Restriction on Providing Funds to the Palestinian Authority (February 8, 2013); Proclamation No. 9072, 78 Fed. Reg. 
80417 (December 23, 2013) (To Take Certain Action Under the African Growth and Opportunity Act and for Other 
Purposes); Proclamation No. 8783, 77 Fed. Reg. 14265 (March 6, 2012) (To Implement the United States-Korea Free 
Trade Agreement).  
6 Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1871); see also Phillip J. Cooper, By Order of the President: 
Administration by Executive Order and Proclamation, 18 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY 233, 240 (August 1986) (citing 
Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 372 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967); Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 
1964); Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U.S. 546, 560-61 (1893)). 
7 44 U.S.C. §1505. The Federal Register Act requires that executive orders and proclamations be published in the 
Federal Register. Id. Furthermore, executive orders must comply with preparation, presentation, and publication 
requirements established by an executive order issued by President Kennedy. See Exec. Order No. 11030, 27 Fed. Reg. 
5847 (1962) codified 1 C.F.R. Part 19.  
8 U.S. CONST., art. II, §§1-3. See Orders and Proclamations, supra note 3, at 6-12. 
9 See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
10 See, e.g., President George Washington’s order of June 8, 1789, asking the heads of executive departments “to 
submit ‘a clear account’ of affairs connected with their [d]epartments,” is listed as the first executive order in a 1943 
publication. See New Jersey Historical Records Survey, Work Projects Administration, List and Index of Presidential 
Executive Orders, at 1 (1943). President Washington’s first proclamations concerned A National Thanksgiving and 
treaties with Indian nations. James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-
1897, Vol. I, at 64, 80-81 (1896). 
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camps during World War II;11 the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus;12 and equal treatment 
in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.13 However, 
Presidents have also used executive orders for arguably more mundane governing tasks such as 
directing federal agencies to evaluate their ability to streamline customer service delivery14 and 
establishing advisory committees.15 Because there is no underlying constitutional or statutory 
authority that dictates the circumstances under which the President must issue an executive order, 
it is probable that the President also could have chosen to issue presidential memoranda rather 
than executive orders. As a matter or historical practice, however, it seems that Presidents are 
more apt to utilize executive orders on matters that may benefit from public awareness or be 
subject to heightened scrutiny. Memoranda, on the other hand, are often used to carry out routine 
executive decisions and determinations, or to direct agencies to perform duties consistent with the 
law or implement laws that are presidential priorities.16 
Judicially Enforced Limitations 
Presidents’ broad usage of executive orders to effectuate policy goals has led some Members of 
Congress and various legal commentators to suggest that many such orders constitute unilateral 
executive lawmaking that impacts the interests of private citizens and encroaches upon 
congressional power.17 The Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 
established the framework for analyzing whether the President’s issuance of an executive order is 
a valid presidential action.18 As discussed below, the framework established by Justice Robert H. 
Jackson in his concurring opinion has become more influential than the majority opinion authored 
by Justice Hugo Black, and has since been employed by the courts to analyze the validity of 
controversial presidential actions. 
                                                 
11 Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (February 25, 1942); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944). 
12 See, e.g., Executive Order from President Lincoln to Major-General H. W. Halleck, Commanding in the Department 
of Missouri (December 1861) in James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 
1789-1902, at 99 (Vol. VI) (“General: As an insurrection exists in the United States and is in arms in the State of 
Missouri, you are hereby authorized and empowered to suspend the writ of habeas corpus within the limits of the 
military division under your command and to exercise martial law as you find it necessary, in your discretion, to secure 
the public safety and the authority of the United States.”); see also Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 115 (1866). 
13 Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 28, 1948) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that 
there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, 
religion or national origin.”). 
14 Exec. Order No. 13571, 76 Fed. Reg. 24339 (May 2, 2011).  
15 Exec. Order No. 13565, 76 Fed. Reg. 7681 (February 11, 2011).  
16 See, e.g., Memorandum on Certification Concerning U.S. Participation in the United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, 79 Fed. Reg. 8077 (February 10, 2014); Memorandum on Waiving 
Prohibition on United States Military Assistance to Parties to the Rome Statute Establishing the International Criminal 
Court, 40 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 561 (April 12, 2004).  
17 See, e.g., William J. Olson and Alan Woll, Policy Analysis, Executive Orders and National Emergencies: How 
Presidents Have Come to “Run the Country” by Usurping Legislative Power, Cato Institute (October 28, 1999); Tara 
L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1 (2002); 
John A. Sterling, Above the Law: Evolution of Executive Orders (Part One), 31 UWLA REV. 99 (2000).  
18 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).  
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 
In 1952, President Harry S. Truman, in an effort to avert the effects of a workers’ strike during the 
Korean War, issued an executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of 
most of the nation’s steel mills to ensure continued production.19 This order, challenged by the 
steel companies, was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Youngstown. Justice 
Black, writing for the majority, stated that under the Constitution, “the President’s power to see 
that laws are faithfully executed refuted the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”20 Specifically, 
Justice Black maintained that presidential authority to issue such an executive order, “if any, must 
stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”21 Applying this reasoning, 
the Court concluded the President’s executive order was effectively a legislative act because no 
statute or constitutional provision authorized such presidential action.22 The Court further noted 
that Congress rejected seizure as a means of settling labor disputes during consideration of the 
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, and instead adopted other processes.23 Given this characterization, the 
Court deemed the executive order to be an unconstitutional violation of the separation-of-powers 
doctrine, explaining that “the Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the 
Congress alone in both good and bad times.”24 
While Justice Black’s majority opinion in Youngstown seems to refute the notion that the 
President possesses implied constitutional powers, it is important to note that there were five 
concurrences in the decision, four of which maintained that implied presidential authority adheres 
in certain contexts.25 Of these concurrences, Justice Jackson’s has proven to be the most 
influential, even surpassing the impact of Justice Black’s majority opinion. Jackson’s 
concurrence, as discussed below, is based on the proposition that presidential powers may be 
influenced by congressional action.  
                                                 
19 Exec. Order No. 10340, 71 Fed. Reg. 3139 (April 10, 1952). 
20 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. 
21 Id. at 585. 
22 Id. at 587 (“The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power as Commander in 
Chief of the Armed Forces.... Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions 
that grant executive power to the President.... The President’s order does not direct that a congressional policy be 
executed in a manner prescribed by Congress—it directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed 
by the President.”).  
23 Id. at 586 (citing 93 Cong. Rec. 3637-3645 where Congress rejected an amendment which would have authorized 
governmental seizures in cases of emergency); see also Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, P.L. 80-101 (1947).  
24 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586-89. 
25 Id. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the 
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a 
gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”); id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 659 
(Burton, J., concurring) (“The present situation is not comparable to that of an imminent invasion of threatened attack. 
We do not face the issue of what might be the President’s constitutional power to meet such catastrophic situations.”); 
id. at 661 (Clark, J., concurring in result only) (“[W]here Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal with the 
type of crisis confronting the President, he must follow those procedures ...; but that in the absence of such action by 
Congress, the President’s independent power to act depends upon the gravity of the situation confronting the nation.”). 
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Justice Jackson’s Concurrence in Youngstown 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson established a tripartite scheme for analyzing the 
validity of presidential actions in relation to constitutional and congressional authority. Because 
“[p]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction 
with those of Congress,” Justice Jackson acknowledged that the three categories he established 
were a “somewhat over-simplified grouping,” but they nonetheless assist in identifying “practical 
situations in which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers, and by 
distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this factor of relativity.”26 
Under the tripartite scheme, the President’s authority to act is considered at a maximum when he 
acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress because this includes “all that he 
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”27 Such action “would be 
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”28 
However, where Congress has neither granted nor denied authority to the President, Justice 
Jackson maintained that the President could still act upon his own independent powers. For this 
second category, there is a “zone of twilight in which [the President] and Congress may have 
concurrent authority, or in which distribution is uncertain.”29 Under these circumstances, Justice 
Jackson observed that congressional acquiescence or silence “may sometimes, at least as a 
practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility,” yet 
“any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary 
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”30 
In contrast, the President’s authority is considered at its “lowest ebb” when he “takes measures 
incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress ... for he can only rely upon his own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”31 Justice 
Jackson observed that courts generally “sustain exclusive presidential control ... only by disabling 
the Congress from acting upon the subject.”32 He cautioned that examination of presidential 
action under this third category deserved more scrutiny because for the President to exercise such 
“conclusive and preclusive” power would endanger “the equilibrium established by our 
constitutional system.”33 
Applying this framework to President Truman’s action, Justice Jackson determined that analysis 
under the first category was inappropriate, due to the fact that seizure of the steel mills had not 
been authorized by Congress, either implicitly or explicitly. Justice Jackson also determined that 
the President Truman’s action could not be defended under the second category because Congress 
                                                 
26 Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). Along similar lines, the Supreme Court later observed “it is doubtless the case 
that executive action in any particular instance falls, not neatly in one of three pigeonholes, but rather at some point 
along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition.” Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981).  
27 Id. at 635-637 (Jackson, J. concurring).  
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 637.  
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 637.  
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 638. 
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had addressed the issue of seizure through statutory policies that conflicted with the President’s 
action.34 Justice Jackson concluded that the President’s action could be sustained only if it passed 
muster under the third category, that is, by finding “that seizure of such strike-bound industries is 
within his domain and beyond the control of Congress.” 35 Specifically, the President would have 
to rely on “any remainder of executive power after such powers as Congress may have over the 
subject” to lawfully seize steel mills. Given that the seizure of steel mills was within the scope of 
congressional power, the exercise of presidential power under these circumstances was “most 
vulnerable to attack and [left the President] in the least favorable of possible constitutional 
postures.”36 
Justice Jackson’s framework for analyzing the validity of presidential actions has endured into the 
modern era.37 For example, the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan referenced Justice 
Jackson’s analytical framework when it upheld executive orders and agency regulations that 
nullified all non-Iranian interests in Iranian assets and suspended all settlement claims.38 Because 
the President had been delegated broad authority under the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act to nullify non-Iranian interests, the Court, invoking Justice Jackson’s first category, 
stated that such action “is supported by the strongest presumption and the widest latitude of 
judicial interpretation.”39 With respect to the suspension of claims, the Court upheld the 
President’s action on the basis that Congress had enacted legislation in the area of the President’s 
authority to deal with international crises and had “implicitly approved the longstanding practice 
of claims settlements by executive agreement.”40 
However, not all courts necessarily invoke Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework in evaluating 
executive orders and actions. For instance, in 1995 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) in Chamber of Commerce v. Reich overturned an executive order 
issued by President William J. Clinton by using traditional tools of statutory interpretation.41 
Relying on his authority pursuant to the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act 
(FPASA),42 President Clinton issued Executive Order 12954, which directed the Secretary of 
Labor to adopt such rules and orders as necessary to ensure that federal agencies would not 
                                                 
34 Id. at 638-39 (“None of the [three statutory methods] were invoked. In choosing a different and inconsistent way of 
his own, the President cannot claim that it is necessitated or invited by failure of Congress to legislate upon the 
occasions, grounds and methods for seizure of industrial properties.”).  
35 Id. at 640. 
36 Id.  
37 See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (holding that a presidential memorandum does not constitute 
directly enforceable law and does not preempt state limitations on the filing of successive habeas petitions, nor can the 
President unilaterally execute a non-self-executing treaty by giving it domestic effect, as the power to implement such a 
treaty falls to Congress); American Int’l Grp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding 
executive orders revoking licenses that had been issued by the federal government and that suspended claims because 
President had authority pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act). 
38 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1982).  
39 Id. at 674.  
40 Id. at 675-88. The Court emphasized the narrowness of its decision, stating that it did not decide “that the President 
possesses plenary power to settle claims, even as against foreign governmental entities.... But where, as here, the 
settlement of claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute 
between our country and another, and where, as here, we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the President’s 
action, we are not prepared to say that the President lacks the power to settle such claims.” Id. at 688.  
41 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (1996).  
42 40 U.S.C. §§471 et seq.  
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contract with employers that permanently replaced striking employees.43 The D.C. Circuit in 
Reich did not invoke or refer to the Youngstown decision when reviewing the validity of the 
executive order.44 The court nonetheless determined that President Clinton’s executive order, 
although issued pursuant to broad authority delegated to him under FPASA, was invalid and 
without legal effect because it conflicted with a provision of the National Labor Relations Act, 
which guarantees the right to hire permanent replacements during strikes.45 
Presidential Revocation and Modification 
of Executive Orders 
Executive orders are undoubtedly one of many tools available to Presidents to further policy goals 
during his Administration. By their very nature, however, executive orders lack stability, 
especially in the face of evolving presidential priorities. The President is free to revoke, modify, 
or supersede his own orders or those issued by a predecessor.46  
The practice of Presidents modifying and revoking executive orders is exemplified particularly 
where orders have been issued to assert control over and influence the agency rulemaking 
process. Beginning with President Gerald Ford’s Administration, the following timeline 
demonstrates the gradual modification by succeeding Presidents in supplementing the 
congressionally mandated rulemaking process with a uniform set of standards regarding cost-
benefit considerations.47  
• President Gerald Ford issued Executive Order 11821, which required agencies to 
issue inflation impact statements for proposed regulations.48  
• President Jimmy Carter altered this practice with Executive Order 12044, which 
required agencies to consider the potential economic impact of certain rules and 
identify potential alternatives.49 
• President Ronald Reagan revoked President Carter’s order and implemented a 
scheme that arguably asserted much more extensive control over the rulemaking 
process. He issued Executive Order 12291, which directed agencies to implement 
rules only if the “potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the 
                                                 
43 Exec. Order No. 12954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13023 (March 10, 1995). 
44 Reich, 74 F.3d at 1322.  
45 Id. at 1339. 
46 For example, on February 17, 2001, President George W. Bush issued several executive orders that revoked several 
of President Clinton’s executive orders regarding union dues and labor contracts, significantly altering several 
requirements pertaining to government contracts. See Exec. Orders Nos. 13201-04, 66 Fed. Reg. 11221, 11225, 11227-
28 (2001) (revoking Exec. Order No. 12871, 58 Fed. Reg. 52201 (1993); Exec. Order 12933, 59 Fed. Reg. 53559 
(1994)). President Obama subsequently revoked the Bush orders. See Exec. Order No. 13496, 74 Fed. Reg. 6107 
(February 4, 2009) (revoking Exec. Order No. 13201); Exec. Order No. 13502, 74 Fed. Reg. 6985 (February 11, 2009) 
(revoking Exec. Order No. 13202); Exec. Order No. 13495, 74 Fed. Reg. 6103 (February 4, 2009) (revoking Exec. 
Order No. 13204).  
47 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§551 et seq. For other laws affecting the rulemaking process, see CRS 
Report RL32240, The Federal Rulemaking Process: An Overview, coordinated by Maeve P. Carey.  
48 Exec. Order No. 11821, 3 C.F.R. 926 (1971-75). 
49 Exec. Order No. 12044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978). 
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potential costs to society.” 50 This required agencies to prepare a cost-benefit 
analysis for any proposed rule that could have a significant economic impact.51 
• President William J. Clinton later issued Executive Order 12866, which modified 
the system established during the Reagan Administration.52 While retaining many 
of the basic features of President Reagan’s order, Executive Order 12866 
arguably eased cost-benefit analysis requirements, and recognized the primary 
duty of agencies to fulfill the duties committed to them by Congress.  
• President George W. Bush subsequently issued two executive orders—Executive 
Orders 13258 and 13422—both of which amended the Clinton executive order.53 
Executive Order 13258 concerned regulatory planning and review, and it 
removed references from Clinton’s executive order regarding the role of the Vice 
President, and instead referenced the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) or the Chief of Staff to the President.54 Executive Order 13422 
defined guidance documents and significant guidance documents and applied 
several parts of the Clinton executive order to guidance documents.55 It also 
required each agency head to designate a presidential appointee to the newly 
created position of regulatory policy officer. Executive Order 13422 also made 
changes to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs’ (OIRA) duties and 
authorities, including a requirement that OIRA be given advance notice of 
significant guidance documents. 
President Barack Obama revoked both of these orders via Executive Order 13497.56 This order 
also instructed the Director of OMB and the heads of executive departments and agencies to 
rescind orders, rules, guidelines, and policies that implemented President Bush’s executive 
orders.57 In addition, President Obama issued two other executive orders on the regulatory review 
process. The first, Executive Order 13563, reaffirmed and supplemented the principles of 
regulatory review in Executive Order 12866.58 Obama’s order addressed public participation and 
agency coordination in simplifying and harmonizing regulations for industries with significant 
regulatory requirements.59 The order also instructed agencies to consider flexible approaches to 
                                                 
50 Exec. Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1981). 
51 Executive Order 12291 was criticized by some as a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine, on grounds that it 
imbued the President with the power to essentially control rulemaking authority that had been committed to a particular 
agency by Congress. See, e.g., Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of 
Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193 (1981); Erik D. Olsen, The Quiet Shift of 
Power: OMB Supervision of EPA Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RES. L. 1 (1984). Despite 
these concerns there were no court rulings that assessed the validity of President Reagan’s order.  
52 Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (October 4, 1993). 
53 Exec. Order No. 13258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9385 (February 28, 2002); Exec Order No. 13422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (January 
23, 2007).  
54 Exec. Order No. 13528, 67 Fed. Reg. 9385 (February 28, 2002). 
55 Exec. Order No. 13422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (January 23, 2007). For more information on how Executive Order 13423 
(now revoked) impacted Executive Order 12866, see CRS Report RL32397, Federal Rulemaking: The Role of the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, coordinated by Maeve P. Carey. 
56 Exec. Order No. 13497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (February 4, 2009) (revoking Executive Orders 13528 and 13422). 
57 Id. 
58 Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (January 21, 2011); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Administrator, OIRA, 
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, and of Independent Regulatory Agencies, on 
Executive Order 13563, “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review” (February 2, 2011), at 1. 
59 Exec. Order No. 13563, §§2-3. 
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regulation, required them to ensure the objectivity of scientific and technical information and 
processes that support regulations, and mandated that agencies develop a preliminary plan to 
review existing significant regulations for potential modifications or repeal.60 The second 
executive order, Executive Order 13579, stated that independent regulatory agencies should also 
comply “to the extent permitted by law” with the goals and requirements of the first order, 
Executive Order 13563.61 
Congressional Revocation and Modification 
of Executive Orders 
Congress may also influence the duration and effectiveness of executive orders. Orders issued 
pursuant to authority provided to the President by Congress, as distinguished from orders that are 
based on the President’s exclusive constitutional authority, may be legislatively modified or 
nullified.62 Congress may revoke all or part of such an order by either directly repealing the order, 
or by removing the underlying authority upon which the action is predicated.63 Either of these 
actions would appear to negate the legal effect of the order.  
Congressional repeals of executive orders are relatively rare in modern times, primarily because 
such legislation could run counter to the President’s interests and therefore may require a 
congressional override of a presidential veto. One study has suggested that less than 4% of 
executive orders have been modified by Congress.64 To effectuate a repeal, Congress need only 
enact legislation directing that provisions of the executive order “shall not have legal effect.”65 
For example, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 explicitly revoked a December 13, 1912, executive 
order that had created the Naval Petroleum Reserve Numbered 2.66 In 1992, Congress similarly 
revoked an executive order issued by President George H. W. Bush that had directed the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a human fetal tissue bank for research 
                                                 
60 Id. at §§4-6. 
61 Exec. Order No. 13579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41587 (July 14, 2011). Generally speaking, executive orders on regulatory 
review have exempted independent regulatory agencies from their requirements by referencing a statutory definition of 
an independent regulatory agency that contains a list of such agencies. 44 U.S.C. §3502. For more analysis, see CRS 
Report R42720, Presidential Review of Independent Regulatory Commission Rulemaking: Legal Issues, by Vivian S. 
Chu and Daniel T. Shedd. 
62 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38. Consistent with the Youngstown framework, Congress’s authority to override an 
executive order relating to an area in which the President and Congress share power would likely depend on “the 
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables. See id. at 637 (“[T]here is a zone of twilight in which he and 
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”).  
63 Congress may also affect executive orders by amending the language to include a sunset provision. If Congress lets 
the sunset provision lapse, the President would no longer have the authority under the statute to act. For example, 
Executive Order 11399 established the National Council on Indian Opportunity (NCIO). This executive order was later 
amended by Executive Order 11688. In 1969, Congress appropriated funds to continue the NCIO for five years at 
which time it would terminate unless reauthorized by Congress. The NCIO is no longer in existence. 
64 See Adam L. Warber, Executive Orders and the Modern Presidency 118-120 (2006).  
65 For a listing of executive orders affected by Congress, see William J. Olson and Alan Woll, Executive Orders and 
National Emergencies: How Presidents Have Come to “Run the Country” by Usurping Legislative Power, available at 
House Comm. on Rules, Subcomm. on Legislative and Budget Process, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., Hearing on the Impact of 
Executive Orders on Lawmaking: Executive Lawmaking?, at 124-27 (October 27, 1999).  
66 P.L. 109-58, §334 (2005); 10 U.S.C. §7420 note. 
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purposes. The repeal legislation stated that “[t]he provisions of Executive Order 12806 ... shall 
not have any legal effect.”67 
Additionally, Congress may also inhibit the implementation of an executive order by preventing 
funds from being used to implement the order. For example, Congress has used its appropriations 
authority to limit the effect of executive orders by denying salaries and expenses for an office 
established in an executive order,68 or by directly denying funds to implement a particular section 
of an order.69 
Conversely, if Congress supports an executive order, and wants to provide the directive with 
greater stability, Congress may codify the presidential order as it was issued or with certain 
modifications.70 Similarly, if the President issues an executive order on questionable legal 
authority, Congress may subsequently ratify the order either expressly or by implication.71 
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67 P.L. 103-43, §121; 107 Stat. 133 (1993). See also H.R. 5658, §2587 (110th Cong., 2d sess.) (would have revoked 
Executive Order 1922 of April 24, 1914, as amended, as it affected certain lands identified for conveyance to Utah).  
68 Congress has repeatedly enacted appropriations laws, which prohibit funds from being used to establish a Legal 
Examining Unit within the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) pursuant to Executive Order 9358, 8 Fed. Reg. 
9175 (July 6, 1943), issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. President Roosevelt had discretionary authority 
pursuant to statute to issue regulations, via executive order, to organize the civil service and direct the Civil Service 
Commission, the precursor to OPM. See P.L. 76-880, §1 (1940) and Exec. Order No. 8743, 6 Fed. Reg. 2117 (April 25, 
1941). Appropriations laws that contain this prohibition include P.L. 105-61; 111 Stat. 1302 (1997); P.L. 105-277; 112 
Stat. 2681-509 (1998); P.L. 106-58; 113 Stat. 462 (1999); P.L. 106-554; 114 Stat. 2763A-149 (2000); P.L. 107-67; 115 
Stat. 541 (2001); P.L. 108-7; 117 Stat. 458 (2003); P.L. 108-199; 118 Stat. 338 (2004); P.L. 108-447; 118 Stat. 3262 
(2004); P.L. 109-115; 119 Stat. 2488 (2005); P.L. 110-161; 121 Stat. 2008-09 (2007); P.L. 111-8; 123 Stat. 669 (2009); 
P.L. 111-117; 123 Stat. 3195 (2009). 
69 See, e.g., P.L. 111-8, §746; 123 Stat. 693 (2009) (preventing funds from being used “to implement, administer, or 
enforce” §5(b) of Executive Order 13422, which was subsequently revoked by Executive Order 13497).  
70 For example, the Homeland Security Council (HSC) was first established by Section 5 of Executive Order 13228, 66 
Fed. Reg. 51812-17 (October 10, 2001). Congress later passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296 
(2002). Title IX of the law established the HSC within the Executive Office of the President. See also Health Equity 
and Accountability Act, H.R. 3090, §421 (111th Cong., 1st sess.) (would have codified Executive Order 12898).  
71 See, e.g., Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC, 574 F. Supp. 946, 953 (W.D. Tenn. 1983) (“Congressional ratification may 
occur when both Houses of Congress either pass legislation appropriating funds to implement the executive order or 
make reference to the executive order in subsequently passed legislation.”).  
